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There is a tradition that departing staff reflect back on their time spent in the 
University of Queensland. I won’t be doing that, except to say that I have enjoyed 
my twenty-eight years here at The University of Queensland. I have enjoyed 
especially the intellectual freedom academic employment has given me to pursue a 
variety of interests. In particular, I have enjoyed thinking about, writing about, and 
teaching History and Theory. I am grateful to successive members of my Honours 
seminar for thought-provoking discussion over the years. I tried not to impose my 
views on students, but rather to get them to think more deeply and clearly about 
what the practice of history entailed. I doubt if many appreciated how my own 
evolutionary theory of history shaped my theoretical understanding of the 
discipline of history, of the history of historiography (retrospect) and where it 
might be going (prospect). It would be surprising, however, if over these years I 
had not come to some conclusions of my own about the nature of history and the 
role of theory in its research and writing. Some of these I shall outline this 
afternoon, in a rather sketchy way, and without, I freely admit, adequate supporting 
argument. That will have to wait until publication of my major retirement project 
— an updated and extended version of my evolutionary theory of history.
Let me begin with some bald statements about where I am coming from. As 
most of you know, my background was in science and mathematics, and I have 
always approached history in the French tradition very much as a social science, 
even if expressed in literary form with marshaled rhetorical support. This leads me 
to entertain the possibility of progress in historiography (about which more later), 
and to see knowledge about the past as essentially similar to knowledge about the 
world around us, both natural and social. Knowledge about the world enables us 
better to interact with it, in the sense that our actions are more likely to have the 
outcomes we intend if our understanding of the world is accurate. Unforeseen 
outcomes result from the extraordinary complexity of the world, which precludes 
full understanding of the interaction of a myriad of interlocking relationships. All 
we can do is monitor outcomes, and reconceptualise the circumstances that gave 
rise to them. In other words, we are constantly forming hypotheses and testing 
them — in everyday life, as well as in science and history. We say: “He must be 
angry because [...]”, or “What the electorate really wants is [...]”. The dialectic of 
existence functions not on the plane of the ideal, as Hegel supposed, or the 
material, as Marx maintained, but between mind and matter, between the world as 
we conceive it to be and how it is in reality. We act upon our conceptions 
(hypotheses), but these may be inaccurate, or the world may have changed in the
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meantime, and so our actions will create new situations that will need re­
conceptualising.
Strictly speaking science produces not knowledge, but information about the 
world and how it works. Information is out there in the world.1 2 It becomes 
knowledge only when it is selectively incorporated into the cognitive structure of 
an individual mind. At that point it becomes available to be acted upon, but for that 
to happen knowledge must take on meaning. That is, it must be conceptually 
related to the individual and her situation as she conceives it, taking account of her 
desires and intentions. Advances in cognitive science make it perfectly clear that 
there is a material basis for the memories whose relationships structure cognition in 
the form of synaptic connections in the micro-structure of the brain.“ The cognitive 
basis for behaviour, in other words, is always constructed from how the world has 
meaning for us.
1 My notion of information here is not exactly what Karl Popper called “world 3” — the “world of 
statements in themselves” that express our subjective understanding (world 2) of the real, physical 
world of objects (world 1), though it largely does comprise such statements. I would want to include 
in addition as information the relations between objects, which may be conceived (world 2 for those 
who do) or not (in which case they remain potential.) Cf. Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An 
Intellectual Autobiography (Glasgow: Collins, 1976), pp. 180-7.
2 A simple account is given in Susan Greenfield, The Human Brain: A Guided Tour (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), pp. 138-46.
3 Cf the diagram in Michael Stanford, The Nature of Historical Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986), p. 6.
Historical knowledge is also about the present world. It is about those aspects of 
the world (our historical sources) that survive from the effect of past actions and 
events. Historians account for these physical remains by reconstructing the 
circumstances that gave rise to them. Such knowledge resides first in the heads of 
historians themselves, then is published as information, and then is cognitively 
assimilated by a reader, when it may or may not be acted upon to have some effect 
upon the world.3 The interpretation (hypothesis) offered by an historian may or 
may not constitute the meaning of past events for a reader, depending on whether 
or not it is compatible with the structure of cognition already built up through 
experience, education, and emotional commitment. This structure of cognition in 
its broad outline is what we call worldview. Historical knowledge designed to 
promote certain behaviours is political in intent, insofar as the behaviours 
themselves are political (that is, designed to promote through the exercise of power 
certain goals and outcomes in competition with other alternative goals). I shall 
have more to say about politics and power later.
What scientific and historical information have in common is that both compete 
for inclusion in cognitive structures, whether in the course of specialist training or 
general reading, or through sound or image or some other medium. Such inclusion 
takes place largely in response to selective pressures that are both external (levered 
through various forms of power) and internal (as a result of the psychological need 
for cognitive consonance with the structure of cognition already in place). Once 
included in cognitive structure through those connections that constitute meaning, 
historical knowledge is able to express itself in behaviour — rather obviously in 
the case of an historian attending a conference, or a traveller visiting some place of 
historical interest; less obviously in the case of a civil servant disposed to favour a
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program for Aboriginal advancement after reading Henry Reynolds and Ray 
Evans.4
4 Heniy Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier: An Interpretation of the Aboriginal Response to 
the Invasion and Settlement of Australia (Townsville: James Cook University, 1981); Raymond 
Evans, Fighting Words: Writing about Race (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999).
5 Cf. Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
6 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacobs, Telling the Truth about History (New York: 
Norton, 1994).
7 (London: Granta, 1997).
8 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
We can no more ignore all historical information, or avoid incorporating a 
selection of it into our structures of cognition than we can ignore other forms of 
information about the world provided by our senses. We are conscious of a four 
dimensional world, including time, in a way no other animal species is, through the 
play of memory. All considered behaviour, all plans for the future draw upon the 
past. Every significant event sends us scurrying to history as a means of 
understanding, of imparting meaning through making temporal connections —just 
as within minutes of 9/11 Pearl Harbour was evoked by commentators groping for 
an apt comparison to give meaning to what was happening. For just as memory 
provides the basis on which all new experience is judged, in relation to which our 
response is calibrated, so history provides the only basis we have for judging the 
significance (that is, the meaning) of new events and how to respond to them. 
History is our communal memory. In that lies its primary importance.
The problem is: how do we construct accurate accounts of the past on which to 
act? How can we be sure that to interpret 9/11 as a Pearl Harbour-like declaration 
of war that requires a similar military response through an expanded war on terror 
is the most effective adaptive response to achieve the desired goal of enhanced 
security? Is it not essential to beware of a whole raft of additional historical 
circumstances that throw doubt on the Pearl Harbour analogy? Or is any story, 
repeated a sufficient number of times, as good as any other as justification of 
political decisions in pursuit of national goals. Essentially this is what 
postmodernism endorses.5
We should be thankful to postmodernism for provoking theoretical debate in 
history. This has ranged well beyond History and Theory into journals like Past 
and Present and the Journal of the American Historical Association. It had also 
produced a number of book-length responses from working historians including 
Appleby, Hunt and Jacobs, Telling the Truth about History,6 7Richard Evans, In 
Defence of History,1 and Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory.8 The latter tackles 
“two major issues” that puzzle Fulbrook: How can historians choose between and 
work with a multiplicity of competing theoretical approaches? And given that they 
do, how can they claim that historical investigation, even as a communal pursuit, 
leads to truth about the past? The strength of the book lies not so much in 
Fulbrook’s conclusions, which strike me as a bit inconclusive, but rather in her 
strong defence of the importance of theory in history research and writing, which, 
she rightly says, is just as intrinsically a theoretical enterprise as it is an empirical
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one.9 For as she notes: “There is no escape from having a theoretical position, 
whether explicit or implicit.”10
9 Ibid., p. 4.
10 Ibid., p. ix.
11 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
12 Ibid., pp. 35-50.
13 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
I concur entirely. The definition of theory that I have always impressed upon my 
students is that it includes all that the historian brings to the writing of history, all 
that intervenes between the raw sources discovered in the archives and the written 
history, from the constitution of facts to the construction of narrative. Very briefly, 
Fulbrook argues that theory necessarily enters into the writing of history on three 
levels, which she calls the theoretical, contextual and metatheoretical.11 123Essentially 
these derive from, respectively, methodological assumptions, the scholarly 
community of which one is a member, and worldview. Together these determine 
the choice by the historian of a preferred theoretical “paradigm” within which to 
work. Such paradigms may be implicit, perspectival (when particular subjects are 
chosen to illuminate an area of inquiry, such as women, or the subaltern), 
paradigms proper (here Fulbrook lists only Marxism, “psychoanalytical 
approaches” and structuralism), and what she calls “pidgin paradigms”, which are 
eclectic.1_
This all seems to me quite confused. The book’s value, however, is to 
foreground the ubiquity and importance of theory in history — and as a stimulus to 
discussion. What it also demonstrates, if inadvertently, is the parlous state of 
historical theory. The term “paradigm” is taken, of course, from Thomas Kuhn’s 
seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions)3 For Kuhn, a paradigm 
defines the current theoretical orthodoxy of a discipline. It is replaced only when it 
proves to be explanatorily inadequate, and then only by another such far-reaching 
paradigmatic theory. The classic sequence is from the Ptolomaic to the Newtonian 
to the Einsteinian universe. Or from Biblical creationism to Linnean classification 
to Darwinian evolution. In history, none of Fulbrook’s three paradigms proper ever 
had this status, and all three are passé. Better to say that history is pre- 
paradigmatic, since we have no generally accepted theory explaining social change.
Fulbrook concludes that history is unable to progress in the same way as the 
natural sciences. The best we can claim is that we have sufficient methodological 
commitments in common across our theoretical differences to be able critically to 
assess the accuracy and interpretive value of the partial histories we produce. There 
is something to this. Such commitments include intellectual honesty, empathy, 
openness to a plurality of voices, and the bracketing out of political and ideological 
beliefs. These are all admirable, but they are not going to advance the claims of 
historians to reveal the truth about the past, nor are they going to prevent the 
writing and use of history for political and ideological purposes. Is there not some 
better hope for the discipline? I would like to think so.
The crucial question is: is historiographical progress possible? The 
postmodernist answer, of course, is no, because no agreed upon criteria exist by 
which to judge whether one history is more truthful than, and so better than, 
another. There are, it seems to me however, two ways in which history might
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progress, both of which require development of theory. The first would require 
acceptance by historians of an over-arching paradigmatic theory of social change 
(in the original strong Kuhnian sense of paradigm — leaving aside the criticism 
that has been levelled against this from the perspective of the sociology of 
knowledge). In the meantime, an alternative approach would be to theorise a 
critical history of historiography. Let me take these in order.
It is not beyond the realms of possibility that there will be constructed a 
paradigmatic theory for the social sciences. I say for the social sciences because a 
paradigmatic theory of history would also be paradigmatic for sociology and 
anthropology, for archaeology and political science. Moreover, as any such theory 
would have to be grounded in psychology, it would also serve as a paradigm for 
psychology too. This is a pretty big ask, but then so was a theory to serve as a 
paradigm for the biological sciences, from the molecular to the population level, to 
cover all living organisms.
A paradigmatic theory in the social sciences would have to be similarly 
comprehensive. It would have to reach from the level of individual cognition and 
behaviour to the composition of cultures, from small groups to nation states. 
Crucially as a theory of history, it would have to explain how change occurs over 
time. It would thus, unlike Marxism (the only one of Fulbrook’s paradigms proper 
that seems to me to warrant the term), but like Darwinian theory of evolution, have 
to focus on mechanism, not stages of development. I have sketched such a theory 
in an article in History and Theory, which was subsequently included in an edited 
volume entitled The Return of Science.14 I won’t go over that again here, except to 
say that I see the world in material terms, and human beings as organisms like any 
other, responding in their behaviour to selective forces in the natural and social 
environment in which they find themselves. Where these forces are controlled or 
manipulated by other individuals, whether singly or through some structured 
association or organisation, this exerts what we call “power”. To reveal the play of 
power is the most important component of all historical explanation. For it is social 
power exerting selective pressure that defines the possibilities of human behaviour 
and action, and it is changes in power relationships — between political, coercive, 
economic and ideological power — that above all bring about historical change.
14 Martin Stuart-Fox, “Evolutionary Theory of History”, History and Theory, Vol. 38 (1999), pp. 33- 
51; reprinted with minor alterations in Phipip Pomper and David Gary Shaw, eds., The Return of 
Science: Evolution, History, and Theory (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 123-144.
The second theoretical development that might result in progress in 
historiography would be if we theorised the history of historiography in terms of 
criteria to be applied to new work. To some extent, of course, we do this already in 
reviewing new histories, but not in any systematic way. Most reviews do not make 
explicit comparisons with earlier work in a field as the basis on which to judge that 
a new history is a better history according to defined criteria — that it is more 
comprehensive, more sophisticated in its causal analysis, more balanced and 
judicious in its evaluations, better presented in argument (the aesthetics of 
structure), better written (the aesthetics of presentation), and so on. What this 
would do would be to situate historiography in relation not only to evidence, but 
also within the critical history of its own production. We expect this in theses, in
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the form of the requisite literature review — but this is often perfunctory, to 
establish where some gap exists in our knowledge, rather than systematic, to 
establish a real basis on which to write better history. Perhaps in this electronic age 
publishers could provide attachments on the web examining an author’s 
historiographical analysis that would situate her book in the history of 
historiography for interested readers.
The key to this second approach to historiographical progress in the present pre- 
paradigmatic state of history is criticism. For Karl Popper, criticism is the driver of 
progress in science, the means by which hypotheses are tested against each other 
and decided upon by the scientific community.15 If we accept the analyses and 
arguments of evolutionary epistemologists such as Donald Campbell,16 as I would 
do, this process of creative theory construction and critical elimination of unfit 
hypotheses is evolutionary, selection being on the basis of explanatory reach and 
depth.17 The same applies to history, except that what is open to criticism is not just 
explanatory hypotheses, but also competing interpretations that seek to provide 
meaning for readers.
15 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Historical Knowledge, 5th ed. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 126-8,313-4.
16 D. T. Campbell, “Evolutionary Epistemology” in P.A. Schilpp, ed.. The Philosophy of Karl Popper 
(La Salle: Open Court, 1974), Vol 1, pp. 413-63.
17 See Gary Cziko, Without Miracles: Universal Selection Theory and the Second Darwinian 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995).
18 Elizabeth Fox Genovese, “History in a Postmodem World” in Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and 
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, eds, Reconstructing History : The Emergence of a New Historical Society 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 4L
If criticism is informed by ideological or political commitment, however, any 
argument may simply become circular. We have no guarantee against this. All we 
can do, as a community of practising historians, is to give assent to the set of 
professional approaches and procedures that comprise historical methodology. 
Training in methodology is therefore essential, and this is what university history 
departments do. Budding historians are introduced not only to the rigours of source 
criticism, but also to the need to question, to test hypotheses against evidence, and 
to rethink or reject those that fail to measure up — not solely against evidence, but 
against other hypotheses or interpretations as well. And all this while placing one’s 
own biases and prejudices as much as possible on hold. Without this shared 
commitment to a learned, constantly honed, methodology, progress in 
historiography, to the extent that it depends on critical peer group evaluation, will 
remain a chimera.
But why is it important to endorse the possibility of historiographical progress? 
Why should we want to commit to what can only be an asymptotic approach to 
truth about the past? Why not, as more extreme postmodernists urge, write history 
for explicitly political or ideological ends, especially such admirable ones as 
universal wellbeing, democracy or liberation? And it is not solely postmodernists 
who argue that it is impossible to separate history from politics, and that historians, 
whether they recognise it or not, are politically implicated. Elizabeth Fox 
Genovese, for example, baldly states “the writing of history is — and always has 
been — a political act”, because, she says, all history “constitutes an intervention in 
human affairs”.18 It is easier to see this, perhaps, in some areas than in others.
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Marxists like Genovese actively sought to change the world, though few now 
accept Marxist theory of history. Feminist historians too acknowledge their work as 
overtly political. My own work has been political in another way. I like the Lao, 
and I respect their desire to govern themselves, despite the fact that their country, 
as it now stands, is a construct of Western imperialism. I have written my history 
of Laos in support of their claim to have an ancient past and the right for their 
country to exist as an independent nation-state.19
19 This is spelled out in the introduction to Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
So if all history is unavoidably political, why bother with truth? Why not write 
history in such a way as to have the greatest desired political effect? My own 
response to this is that knowledge about the past is like any other knowledge about 
the world. If it is not accurate then acting upon it will have unforeseen 
consequences that will be potentially maladaptive. Take, for example, the Balkan 
conflict. Accounts of it can be written from partisan Serb, Croat or Muslim 
positions. Acting upon such partisan histories, however, would promote and 
prolong conflict, to the detriment of all communities concerned. Better to 
understand the roots of conflict, the circumstances that led to extremism, and the 
dreadful toll this took in human suffering. In other words, better to confront, if not 
the truth about the past, then at least the best approximation we can arrive at — as 
providing the most effective basis for action.
The social role of historians, therefore, is, in Edward Said’s memorable phrase, 
to speak truth to power. Doing so is not to resile from political commitment. 
Historians are not divorced from the societies in which they live. Nor are 
universities ivory towers, despite popular belief. Historians are involved in the 
propagation of information and ideas (facts, explanations, interpretations) about the 
past, upon which others will act. This information, these ideas, compete with others 
in the form of ill-founded beliefs, deliberate distortion and propaganda for 
inclusion in cognitive structures. In so competing, historians speak with 
professional authority, which exerts selective pressure in favour of what we have to 
say. This is a source of power, though it may well be insufficient to counter other 
forms of power or the strength of personal interest or ideological commitment. 
What authority we have rests on a claim to expertise about the past, to possess if 
not historical truth then at least a closer approximation to it than others provide. 
Given the evolutionary process by which knowledge grows, we will actually never 
be in a position to speak absolute truth to power. But even in this pre-paradigmatic 
phase of the social sciences, we are in a position to speak alternative narratives to 
the ones officially propagated in the interests of ruling elites or power cliques, and 
to speak them with the strong claim to greater accuracy — a claim that rests, let me 
reiterate, on the methodological rigour of our methodological training.
So we return to methodology as the basis of our claim to authority, to exercise 
what power we have to shape perceptions, and so action based upon them, in a 
socially responsible and beneficial manner. That methodology entails far more than 
how to find our way in the archives and the skills of detection, important as these 
may be. It also entails a profound understanding of the nature of historical 
knowledge, of its epistemological claims, and of the criteria by which those claims
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are judged. No less is required if historians are to speak with authority. This is why 
theory, not just historiographical analysis, is so essential a part of the training of 
historians. It is also why as much as possible the nature of the claim to a 
considerable degree of truth of historical knowledge should be made clear to the 
wider intake of students who take our undergraduate courses. I like to think that we 
at the University of Queensland have been and are conscious of this need, and that 
we attempt to meet it. For my part I count it a privilege to have been part of this 
intellectual and practical endeavour over the past years.
